{"data":[{"id":2417,"slug":"video-public-lecture-timothy-snyder-not-even-past-ukrainian-histories-russian","language_id":1,"title":"Public Lecture by Timothy Snyder: \"Not Even Past: Ukrainian Histories, Russian Politics, European Futures\"","short_title":null,"media_type":1,"description":"
May 15-19, 2014, Kyiv \u00a0<\/p>\n I'm going to say a very quick word about something you all know, that is to say, about the European history of Ukraine. \u00a0And then, I will try to develop an argument about how the European history of Ukraine mattered, as the national way of seeing the world came to be prominent, and then say a word about how the European history of Ukraine matters as Europe itself becomes the way that we think about the past.<\/p>\n So, it's controversial where I come from, but you all know that Ukraine has a European history. \u00a0In fact, it's a very typical European history. \u00a0The beginnings of Ukrainian history, or the beginnings of Kyivan Rus, in a confrontation between Vikings and local peoples, this is central to the history of France. \u00a0It's central to the history of Great Britain. \u00a0These are central European themes. \u00a0The next stage in the history of Kyivan Rus, the confrontation\u00a0between Eastern\u00a0Christianity and Western\u00a0Christianity, the various bargains, the various betrayals that were made in Kyiv as in Warsaw, as in Prague, as in Bulgaria, as East European leaders oscillated between Rome and Byzantium, trying to find the best possible bargain: this is also a very typical European story. \u00a0After the end of Rus, the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania - which is, I think, the step in Ukrainian history which is most often forgotten: it's forgotten in Lithuania, it's forgotten in the West - is a very interesting stage, because it is in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania that the Kyivan inheritance is preserved: the Kyivan language, the language of state; also the Kyivan law code. \u00a0These things are preserved precisely in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. \u00a0<\/p>\n The next stage in the European history of Ukraine is, of course, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, after 1569, after\u00a0the Union of Lublin. \u00a0The Union of Lublin is a very important moment, because it draws a line\u00a0between what is now Belarus and what is now Ukraine, for the first time in history. \u00a0Ukrainian territory falls under the Polish crown, the rest falls into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. \u00a0And it is during this period, the period of the\u00a0Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, that the history of Ukraine is, so to say, most recognizably European. \u00a0This is the period when we see a Renaissance, a Reformation, a Counter-Reformation, all of these nice things. \u00a0It's a period when we see a Republic. \u00a0The specialty of Polish history at this moment is that Polish history recreates all the things that it didn't really have: so, Polish history has a renaissance, but it doesn't have a \u201cnaissance.\u201d \u00a0There was no classical history in Poland, but there is a renaissance all the same. \u00a0And Ukraine takes part in that renaissance. \u00a0Poland calls itself a republic; it has no ancient republican traditions, but it refers to them all the same. \u00a0Ukraine is part of that republic. \u00a0But within that republic, we have a very important tension, a tension that is worth recalling today. \u00a0The tension is between the very few Ukrainians, the magnates, the great aristocrats, the \"mahniteria,\" who did extremely well in this republic, and the vast majority of the population that did not. \u00a0<\/p>\n And so the rebellion, which is against actually the rulers of Ukraine, the rebellion against the\u00a0Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which is in fact against the rulers of Ukraine, is a rebellion against inequality, it's a rebellion on behalf of people who are excluded from the system, people who call themselves Cossacks. \u00a0It's a very important moment in Ukraine's European history, but it's also the moment when a certain stage of that history breaks down. \u00a0Because, as you all know, the Cossacks find themselves in an alliance with Muscovy, the Cossacks then find themselves under Muscovy, and after 1667 this city, and all of right-bank[KP1]\u00a0 Ukraine, finds itself under Muscovy, then under the Russian Empire. \u00a0It's a very important turning point because from 1667 onwards, until, let's say, about two decades ago, the elites from this city primarily moved northwards, to Moscow. \u00a0<\/p>\n Now, that is a very short sketch of a certain history. In the 19th century, all Europeans, not just Ukrainians or Poles or Russians, but all Europeans, had to remake their history in a national form. \u00a0That was the dominant spirit, the dominant ethos, of the day. \u00a0Everyone had a complicated history, which was reshaped, remade, reconstructed - as Konstantin was nice enough to refer to my book - reconstructed as a new sort of history, as a national sort of history. \u00a0And here, too, it's striking how typical Ukraine is. \u00a0The move to romanticism, to populism, that begins in Kharkiv, which spreads to Kyiv, and then to Lviv - Lviv was actually at the end of this, and not at the beginning - is very typically European. \u00a0The idea that you have to move history away from the elites and in Eastern Europe away from the state and towards the people and their language and their stories and their songs is quintessentially European. \u00a0It's something that is absolutely typically European. \u00a0It begins in Germany, it spreads elsewhere. \u00a0Now, what's worth noticing here - and this is a crucial moment too - is that Ukrainian romanticism, Ukrainian populism, the move in Ukrainian history to put the people at the center of the story, is primarily against the history of the Commonwealth. \u00a0It's primarily against Poles, or Poles identified, as Shevchenko put it, as the aristocrats and the priests. \u00a0Populism is directed against the western neighbor, and thus in some sense against Europe. \u00a0And this is a very important tendency to watch play out. \u00a0In other words, Ukrainian patriots, or people who were identifying with the Ukrainian speaking population, always had at least two problems. \u00a0They had the problem of the\u00a0Russian Empire, and they had the problem of Poland. \u00a0And from the point of view of the 18th and 19th century, you could make an argument about which of these was Europe. \u00a0You can certainly make an argument that\u00a0St. Petersburg was Europe. \u00a0You could also make an argument that Warsaw was Europe. \u00a0But in both cases, they seemed to be a problem. \u00a0And this is a development that we're going to watch.<\/p>\n So, these tensions - the multiple problems that Ukrainian patriots faced, the multiple problems that Ukrainian state builders faced - become apparent in 1914. \u00a01914 is a moment where I would say things start to become very unusual. \u00a0Thus far I've emphasized how typically European Ukrainian history is. \u00a0In 1914 something unusual happens. \u00a0The First World War in Eastern Europe - and now I'm going to lose all my Polish and Czech and Romanian friends - is generally a moment when you do nothing for statehood, but you get it anyway. \u00a0There went my chance to write the Polish history textbooks. \u00a0But in general, there's very little connection\u00a0between how hard you fight for national independence and whether you get national independence. \u00a0So, Romania does very little in the First World War but it gets a lot of territory. \u00a0Czechoslovakia, the Czechs and the Slovaks are fighting on the wrong side, but they get an entirely new state. \u00a0The Polish movement for independence exists, but it's very minor, and nevertheless an entirely new Polish state is created. \u00a0And so on and so on. \u00a0In general, you don't have to do very much. \u00a0Serbia started the war - the war was Serbia's fault - and yet Serbia ends the war as the central part of a much bigger state, Yugoslavia. \u00a0But the Ukrainian case here is atypical: after the war, many Ukrainians do fight for independence. \u00a0There are two major efforts to create a Ukrainian state, one based in Kyiv, one based in Galicia. \u00a0All of you already know this. \u00a0There are a huge number of casualties on the part of people fighting for Ukrainian independence: Kyiv eastward, and then all the way back to Warsaw, in fact. \u00a0As you probably know, there are a good number of Ukrainian soldiers buried in Polish military cemeteries in Warsaw because they were fighting all the way back to Warsaw in August 1919. \u00a0So here you have this unusual situation: you have a lot of conflict, a lot of people who are dying to create a state, but at the end of it no state. \u00a0At the end of it, the failure to create a state. \u00a0The failure to create a state because the Russian Whites are against this, because the Poles only support it very late and within certain boundaries, but ultimately\u00a0because it's the Red Army that wins this very complicated civil war.<\/p>\n Now, this brings me to the Soviet Union. \u00a0And the Soviet period in Ukrainian history is extremely interesting. \u00a0It's extremely interesting because the victory of the Red Army, the creation of the Soviet Union, casts the question of Ukraine and Europe in an entirely new way, because, after all, the Soviet Union - and there are many things to say about the Soviet Union; I'm only going to focus on one aspect here - the Soviet Union was, among many other things, an attempt to recreate Europe. \u00a0The premise of the Soviet Union was: \"We are a backward country; we need to recreate capitalism - that is to say, Europe - in order to surpass it later on.\" That is the premise of the Soviet Union. \u00a0The second premise of the Soviet Union is that nations exist, although maybe not forever. \u00a0So the Soviet Union is established as a state which is going to try to create something that looks like capitalism, in order to go past capitalism, and as something which has interior national boundaries, in order eventually to transcend them, to go beyond them. \u00a0So a Ukrainian republic is created inside the Soviet Union. \u00a0<\/p>\n Now, I know it's easy to dismiss this reality. \u00a0It's easy to say the Soviet Union was just very repressive, and of course it was, and I've written about that. \u00a0But there's something here to be understood, that we have to understand before we get to the end of the story, and that is the way that Europe was both a model and an enemy at the same time in the Soviet Union, and the way that this was most intense in the case of Ukraine. \u00a0Europe is a model because the entire Soviet Union has to catch up to Europe, but it's also an enemy because it's capitalist. \u00a0And this ambivalence is most intense in Ukraine because Ukraine is, of course, the western frontier of the Soviet Union. \u00a0It's a big republic that has a long border with Poland and Romania, therefore with Europe. \u00a0So in the 1920s, in this very interesting period of affirmative action for Ukrainians within the Soviet Union, of the subsidization of Ukrainian culture, of the support of Ukrainian modernism and futurism, you see this tension be resolved, because yes, a new generation of Ukrainian writers and artists and even historians grows up within the Soviet Union, making very interesting art, writing very good novels, carrying out very good scholarship. \u00a0But they are generally pro-European. \u00a0<\/p>\n And now this is a story that you know. \u00a0Somewhere around 1928, 1929, 1930 it's no longer all right to be in favor of Europe. \u00a0Especially after January 1930, when collectivization begins in earnest, and peasants resist collectivization in Soviet Ukraine massively. \u00a0From that point forward, something turns. \u00a0Europe is no longer seen as a model. \u00a0It's no longer acceptable to be pro-European. \u00a0Instead, all the problems of collectivization, including the famine, are now blamed on Europe. \u00a0I don't know how closely the rest of you have read this propaganda - I spent a long time with it.\u00a0 The idea is expressed that the famine in Ukraine is the fault of Poland, because Polish agents are paying Ukrainian nationalists inside the Ukrainian Communist party and so on. \u00a0And then at a slightly later stage, after the famine has happened, the discussions of the famine are blamed on Nazi Germany. \u00a0So if you mention that there was a famine in Soviet Ukraine, this means, according to Soviet propaganda, that you were an agent of Nazi Germany. \u00a0<\/p>\n Now this is a very interesting moment, of course. \u00a0I mean, it's a horrible moment, it's a terrible moment, but it's an interesting moment for our story of Europe and European futures, because it's at this moment that the dichotomy, the Manichaean absolute opposition between fascism and anti-fascism is created, where anti-fascism means we have no external colonies. \u00a0I quote Comrade Stalin. \u00a0Unlike the Western powers, we have no external colonies, therefore we must colonize ourselves. \u00a0Which means very precisely exploiting the peasants and exploiting the lands. \u00a0That's one model of colonization. \u00a0A second model of colonization comes from Nazi Germany: the idea of lebensraum, the idea of living space, that we all know, has a precise geography. \u00a0The precise geography of lebensraum is Ukraine. \u00a0Like Stalin, Hitler understood Ukraine as a breadbasket. \u00a0He understood it as a place that could feed an entire continent. \u00a0The question was just which continent that was going to be. \u00a0Whereas Stalin presented Ukraine as the territory that must be controlled if the Soviet Union was going to survive the world capitalist conspiracy, Hitler presented Ukraine as the territory that must be controlled if Germany was going to survive the world Jewish conspiracy. \u00a0So in both cases there is a regional colony that has to be mastered, that has to be controlled, in the service of a slightly lunatic but very coherent ideology about the way the world actually works. \u00a0Or, to put it in more technical terms, there was a territory that had to be controlled if you wanted to be a world power, whether you were in Berlin, or whether you were in Moscow. \u00a0Now, the Germans looked at collective farming and they saw it as a positive model. \u00a0The German planners assumed that they were going to keep the collective farms in Ukraine as a means of controlling the population and of controlling the food supply. \u00a0Their idea was that they would extract the food from Ukraine and use it to feed Germany and Western Europe, and along the way starve 30 million Soviet citizens to death in the winter of 1941. \u00a0They never starved that many people, but the intention gives you a sense of what they intended to do if they could control the western Soviet Union. \u00a0<\/p>\n So, here we see a kind of extreme. \u00a0We see Ukraine at the middle of unmistakably European projects at a time when perhaps Europe deserved its good name less than it does today. \u00a0This is a very different Europe. \u00a0These were unmistakably European projects that put Ukraine in the middle. \u00a0Ukraine was in the middle of two rival European projects based on global ideologies aiming for world power. \u00a0Now, just exactly how this plays out in practice is the subject of my book Bloodlands, which Konstantin was kind enough to mention. \u00a0But the general outcome you all know: between 1933 and 1945 there was no more dangerous place in the world than Ukraine. \u00a0More people were killed as a result of policy in Ukraine than anywhere else in the world between 1933 and 1945. \u00a0<\/p>\n I won't tell that whole story, but within that story of Soviet power, German power, rivalry and war, there's also a smaller story of alliance that I want to make sure that we don't skip over without mentioning. \u00a0The alliance between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany between 1939 and 1941, the time of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, is very important for how we think about Europe today. \u00a0Or, it's very important, to put it a different way, for how people in Moscow think about Europe today. \u00a0Because the period of the alliance with Nazi Germany shows what anti-fascism actually was. \u00a0Anti-fascism didn't mean actually opposing fascists. \u00a0Anti-fascism meant strengthening and protecting the Soviet state. \u00a0The alliance with Hitler, in Stalin's mind, was a way of turning Europe against itself. \u00a0The idea was, and Stalin was very explicit about this, if Germany and the Soviet Union are allied, then the Second World War will be a war between Germany and France and Britain, and the result of this will be the destruction of Europe, the hastening of the contradictions of capitalism to their final collapse. \u00a0So you see there's a very interesting model here between 1939 and 1941. \u00a0The model is, you say you're against fascism, you make an alliance with the actual fascists, and you try to destroy Europe. \u00a0We'll get back around to that.<\/p>\n From here, we're now at the midpoint. \u00a0From here we move into a very interesting stage, which begins still before you were born - you're awfully young. \u00a0I'm now going to tell you something which you will laugh at, because everyone in the world thinks this is funny. \u00a0The crucial decade, and the really interesting decade, is the 1970s. \u00a0Ok, you didn't laugh - that's nice. \u00a0That's very respectful. \u00a0The 1970s are, I think, the axial decade. \u00a0They're\u00a0the crucial moment that brings us to where we are today. \u00a0Because in the 1970s, you begin to see a competition between two ideas of integration, a competition which is still going on, but which has to do with, in the end, where Ukraine actually is. \u00a0In the 1970s in the Soviet Union, there is no longer the hope that Ukrainians will become Soviets and the Soviet Union will become a utopia, but there is the idea that Ukrainians will become Soviets. \u00a0And there is the Brezhnev project of making sure that the Soviet Union just has one humanist intelligentsia, one technical intelligentsia, and that these intelligentsias speak Russian. \u00a0There is the shift away from the Ukrainian language in elementary schools, high schools, and universities in this country. \u00a0<\/p>\n That is one project of integration. \u00a0And then, on the other side, there is a European project of integration, which by the 1970s has been going on for a couple of decades, which by the 1970s receives a lot of attention in the Soviet empire and a bit of attention in Ukraine itself. \u00a0There is a European project that leads indirectly to the Helsinki final act of 1975, of which the European states, Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union are all signatories. \u00a01975 and the Helsinki Final Act is a symbolic moment in politics\u00a0because here, as elsewhere in\u00a0Eastern Europe, people seize onto the idea of human rights, an immanently European, also of course American, idea, but less well known is what the 1970s mean for Ukrainians and Poles. \u00a0And in particular for a particular conversation in which, for the first time, really, in decades, and arguably in centuries - I would say probably centuries - for some Ukrainians Poland starts to seem like Europe, and Europe starts to seem like a positive thing at the same time. \u00a0Those are two very important developments. \u00a0And they begin with the conversation in the 1970s in which some people here I see took part, centered around the journal Kultura, in which Poles said, \"We are interested in a future independent Ukraine in its existing borders\" - that is, okay, we're fine, we're not going to claim Lw\u00f3w - while many Ukrainian intellectuals were moving towards a civic understanding of Ukrainian patriotism, which made it easier for them to talk about Poland. \u00a0To make a long story short, this meant that in 1989 something very important, a very important success could happen. \u00a0Polish foreign policy in 1989, when Poland was sovereign but Ukraine was not yet sovereign, could openly declare, \"We are following a policy of European standards. \u00a0European standards mean we recognize your boundaries, we recognize your western boundary. \u00a0We recognize your western boundary even though you don't exist yet. \u00a0We preemptively recognize your western boundary.\" Many preemptive things are bad. \u00a0Preemptively recognizing someone's boundary is probably good. \u00a0And this reference to Europe was actually true, because an essential part of the European project is that boundaries are not challenged. \u00a0The boundaries of states are taken for what they are. It's assumed that then you can have movement across those boundaries, and you can create something meaningful in that way. \u00a0So, in this way, something begins to shift. \u00a0Another, a positive idea of Europe, in which Poland could play a positive role - because that's very important: if Poland is negative, it's very hard to code Europe as positive - anyway, that new idea begins to take shape.<\/p>\n I'm going to pass over the history of the last couple of decades in Ukraine, because you know it, you know it better than I do: the history of foreign policy that shifts from east to west, east to west, east to west, the history of domestic policy, which is an alternation among various oligarchical clans, the way that this ends, I think decisively, in 2013 and 2014 with the Maidan. \u00a0What I want to emphasize instead is the way that another project has now in fact emerged. \u00a0As of the early 21st century, the European Union seems to be the only game in town. \u00a0And it is very attractive. \u00a0It is attractive to a whole group of East European countries who join, a whole group of East European states who don't actually imagine themselves without Europe. \u00a0It's a very striking thing that as soon as sovereignty is gained, the immediate step was to try to compromise that sovereignty. \u00a0But over the course of the early 21st century, it could seem that this was the only integration project. \u00a0The old Soviet integration project was gone; the Soviet Union was gone. \u00a0The European project was moving onwards: in the 1990s, the early 21st century, Europe arguably presented - I now feel guilty in front of my Americans compatriots - Europe arguably presented the most impressive common market, the most impressive collective, if you like, welfare state that had ever existed. \u00a0And Europeans had a certain tendency to believe that this was it, this was the only model, and everyone likes us. \u00a0<\/p>\n Now, what's happened in the last year - and here I'm moving towards my conclusion - what's happened in the last year is that something has fundamentally changed. \u00a0There is now a rival to this project. \u00a0The rival is not a Soviet rival, and it's not exactly a Russian rival, although it comes from the Russian Federation. \u00a0The rival is this Eurasian project. \u00a0And what's special about Eurasia - both as an ideology in the words of Dugin or as a policy in the hands of Putin - what's special about Eurasia is that for the very first time, someone - I mean, aside from some of my more radical Republican friends back home - someone is treating the European Union as an enemy. \u00a0Someone is treating the European Union as something which is evil and needs to be destroyed. \u00a0Someone is mounting a cultural, ideological and political attack on the European Union as such. \u00a0Now, I'm not telling you the history that you already know of the Maidan. \u00a0You are here. \u00a0What I'm trying to stress is that this counter-project revealed itself during\u00a0the Maidan. \u00a0For those of us who were watching from afar, who were spending the day paying attention to the Maidan and the night watching Russian television, it was very clear that something had changed fundamentally in Russian propaganda. \u00a0You've all noticed this too. \u00a0That the Maidan was being treated as aggression from the European Union. \u00a0Not just the Americans: I mean, of course it's our fault. \u00a0Let's take that for granted. \u00a0But for the first time something was being presented as aggression from the European Union, and that aggression was coded in certain ways. \u00a0As decadent, to use the dominant word. \u00a0Where decadent means all kinds of toleration of things that I would regard as essential human freedoms: how you would like to live and with whom and in what way. \u00a0Essential civil rights. \u00a0So, the European Union is being coded not only as an enemy, but as decadent. \u00a0And this is new, and the Maidan brought this out, because the trend of presenting - this whole trend of presenting Yevropa as Gayvropa, which was already there - it sounds funny, but it's actually not funny - which was already there in Russia came much more to the fore, because the Maidan was then described to the rest of the world in this way, as part of this offensive of this evil and decadent European Union.<\/p>\n This has led to a very interesting dichotomy in the way that Russia is presenting Ukraine to the rest of the world. \u00a0To us in the West, as I'm sure you're aware, what the Russian propaganda says is: Ukrainians are bad Europeans, because they're fascists. \u00a0Meanwhile, although that exists in Russia too, but meanwhile within Russia the problem is that Ukrainians are too good Europeans. \u00a0You're too much like Europeans, that's the problem. \u00a0You're different, you're like Europeans. \u00a0So there's this basic contradiction in the Russian propaganda, a logical contradiction. \u00a0And of course it's bound to a political contradiction, because the Eurasian project finds and seeks allies across the European far right, and this is now no longer a secret. \u00a0I mean, the members of the European far right parties in France, as we see, in Austria, the smaller parties across Europe, Hungary, Greece, you name it, they have all been recruited and they have all essentially publically pledged allegiance to the Putinist project. \u00a0So there is now a kind of fashion turn; there is now an international cooperative movement of far right parties, which is basically centered in Moscow. \u00a0At the same time, everyone is supposed to criticize Ukraine, because Ukraine is too far to the right. \u00a0So, all of the European far right is for Russia, and yet we're not supposed to like Ukraine because it's on the far right. \u00a0So there's a contradiction here, which it's taken us a while to see, but which is very clear. \u00a0<\/p>\n Now, no one in Moscow cares about these contradictions, because they assume that we in the West are simply too slow and stupid to pick them up - and, unfortunately, they're mostly right. \u00a0We are very slow, and we have to be slow, because we're pluralists. \u00a0We take arguments seriously, we think every argument belongs to a constituency, we have to balance it all out: on the one hand, on the other hand, and so on. \u00a0And honestly, that's what's good about us. \u00a0We can't be so quick because we think there are different kinds of arguments we have to...But this is not actually a difficult one to have to think through, and I'm confident that we'll think it through pretty quickly. \u00a0But the contradictions don't matter; in Moscow, they're perfectly aware that these are contradictions; they just don't care. \u00a0What matters is that this is a coherent project. \u00a0It's not at all crazy or irrational, it's not the kind of thing that if you point out the contradictions it then goes away. \u00a0It's a coherent project, the aim of which is to bring down the European Union and replace it with an alternative European project, which is where I want to conclude with this idea of European futures.<\/p>\n Of course the European futures have everything to do with the past, everything to do with the past as it happened, everything to do with the past as we remember it, as we constantly remember it. \u00a0There are multiple European futures now. \u00a0There's one European future which is not possible. \u00a0That is the European future of the return to the nation-state. \u00a0And this is true here just as it's true in the European Union. \u00a0In different ways, Ukraine and European Union member states face the same situation. \u00a0You know, or at least all sensible people in Ukraine know, that a strong Ukrainian state will exist insofar as it is integrated with other meaningful and hopefully well-meaning entities in the world. \u00a0This is true in Ukraine, just like it's true in Belgium or Austria or Italy. \u00a0None of those places are tenable by themselves. \u00a0This is why the position is the same in the European Union: in the European Union, in the elections for Parliament which are going on right now, big important parties are campaigning on the platform of going back to the nation-state, which is a foolish utopia, a foolish, self-destructive utopia. \u00a0Anyone who knows anything about Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, leaving aside the Second World War, but just the 1920s and 1930s, knows how nasty that was. \u00a0How painful that was. \u00a0How utterly and qualitatively different that was from the 1950s and the 1960s or today. \u00a0But that is the utopia, of going back to the nation state. \u00a0That future is not possible. \u00a0That is a utopia. \u00a0That can't happen. \u00a0What can happen is Eurasia. \u00a0That idea of returning to the nation-state, or of a nation-state being by itself, whether that nation-state is Austria or Ukraine, leads, so to speak, inevitably to Eurasia, because the Eurasian project is precisely to make Europe, the whole of it, look like Ukraine does now: that is, alone, without enough friends who understand it, fragmented, intervened in from the outside. \u00a0That's the idea. \u00a0What Russian policy towards Ukraine is now, of course it's directly a Ukrainian policy, and I don't mean to diminish that, I don't mean to diminish your very special situation, but it is also a test case for the European Union as a whole. \u00a0<\/p>\n In this way, Ukraine and Europe are now bound together, I think, much more than Europeans or even Ukrainians have quite understood. \u00a0There is a Eurasian future, which you can all go into together, and there is a European future, a European Union future, which you can all go into together. \u00a0There isn't anything else. \u00a0That's what you have in common. \u00a0Oh, well, I didn't have applause written here. \u00a0I don't mean this politically; this is just a logical deduction. \u00a0Staying around as a nation-state is as much a fantasy for you as it is for the Italians, or for the Belgians. \u00a0Europe will be together, or Europe will be Eurasia.\u00a0<\/p>\n Ukraine is the European present.\u00a0 We have now reached a point where Ukrainian history and European history are very much the same thing, for good or for evil.\u00a0 The European Union is no longer alone in the world.\u00a0 The European Union can no longer delude itself that it has no enemies. The European Union can lose control of its own references, as is going on in this information war about the Second World War.\u00a0 The European Union no longer controls the history of the Second World War. German elites are losing control of the history of the Second World War, as we watch.\u00a0 So Europe is losing control of its history, it\u2019s losing control of its references: the information war, which is so sharp here, is taking place across the entirety of the West.\u00a0 And it\u2019s working better in Germany, by the way, than it\u2019s working here.\u00a0 So, an entire European order \u2013 the entire European order \u2013 is under challenge, just as Ukraine is under challenge.\u00a0 Not as immediately, not as sharply, not as painfully, but it is now one challenge.\u00a0 And in that sense European futures depend upon Ukrainian futures, just as Ukrainian futures depend upon European futures.\u00a0 Thank you very much.<\/p>","short_description":" May 15-19, 2014, Kyiv 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lecture by Slavenka Drakuli\u0107: \"Intellectuals as Bad Guys? The Role of Intellectuals in the Balkan Wars\"","short_title":null,"media_type":1,"description":" \u00a0<\/p>\n May 15-19, 2014, Kyiv <\/em><\/p>\n International conference \"Ukraine: Thinking Together\"\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n I\u2019m very pleased, and it\u2019s my pleasure to be here, and to be invited, because first of all I\u2019m for the first time in Kyiv, in Ukraine. I\u2019ve never been here before. I must say, I\u2019m very curious about the city, but also I\u2019m even more curious about people.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n I wanted to do the following: I want to tell you in a simplified way (because for the lecture I can\u2019t go into details), simply what happened in Yugoslavia, because I think, many of you are too young even to remember it. I think Yugoslav wars for you are like \u0406\u0406 World War to me, something that was long ago. And then discuss the role of intellectuals, because I think that is an important issue, and that in this situation that you are having now in Ukraine, you should have it on your mind.<\/span><\/p>\n I\u2019m not actually going to lecture you about what should you do, how should you do etc. I\u2019m speaking basically from the bottom up, from the everyday experience. So take it more like my reportage, so to say, more than any kind of theory.<\/p>\n But first let me tell you to supplement what you said, who I am. I am a writer, a journalist. I was born in Croatia and lived there until 1993. And then, mostly for the reasons that it was very difficult to work under the conditions that I found myself treated as some kind of a dissident (that is the opponent to the nationalism and war). And for the next 10 years I wasn\u2019t able to publish in my own country. I was publishing abroad. But this is not important. Important is that I published three books about the communism and three books about the war. And perhaps at this conference I\u2019m in the unique position to speak as someone, who is from Eastern Europe, and who lived through the war (not so many people can have this \u201cfantastic\u201d experience of living through the war, and I do not advise anybody to live through the war, if it doesn\u2019t need be).<\/p>\n So, why speaking about \u201cintelligentsia\u201d? Oh, no, let me tell you first, what happened in Yugoslavia. Most of you, I think, were born after 1991. No? Ok. But you were babies in 1991, so you can\u2019t really remember what happened. Yugoslavia was a socialist country. You know, I hope, you noticed that abroad, in the West, they call all those countries \u201ccommunist countries\u201d. And, of course, in countries themselves they call the regime \u201csocialist\u201d. But I mean, this got so much use (that expression \u201ccommunist countries\u201d) that I will be using it too. However, you know, it was called \u201csocialist country\u201d. So what happened in Yugoslavia? It was a socialist country that was outside of the block. It was outside of the block since 1948. It consists of six republics, had four languages and three religions. And it was a very complicated federal structure. But we lived in peace. And not only we lived in peace, but very much mixed ethnically. For example, before the war broke out in Bosnia, there were 35% of children from mixed marriages.<\/p>\n During the II World war something happened in Yugoslavia that was not mentioned later very much in our schoolbooks. And this was the civil war. There was an antifascist war, there also was a communist revolution with Tito, but there was also the civil was between Serbs and Croats, which had enormous consequences for the war to come in Balkans in former Yugoslavia. And it\u2019s actually three wars we are talking about: the war in Croatia, the war in Bosnia, and the war in Kosovo. So we are talking about wars in Yugoslavia, not about one war. Of course, when it happened, everybody was absolutely shocked. All the world was shocked. Why? Because it was such an independent beautiful country with very good standard of living, with people living in peace together for about 45 years. So why did the war happened there? How come that this was the only country that did not have the \u201cvelvet\u201d revolution ( separation without blood)? \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0<\/p>\n In Bosnia they have a list with close to a hundred thousand people killed. So now I speak about Bosnia, facts about Bosnia. In Croatia the number is about 10.000 dead. But then there\u2019s about between 30.000 to 60.000 women been raped in Bosnia. It is just to give you the glimpses of the numbers. So it\u2019s an enormous human tragedy. But how did this tragedy happen and why?<\/span><\/p>\n I remember Alija Izetbegovi\u0107, who was at that time a president of Bosnia, and who in 1992, when Croatia was already in war, came on TV and said: \u201cYou see this building (and this was some sky-scraper). In this building, on the same floor, we have Bosnians, Muslims, we have Serbs, Croats living door-to-door with each other. Nobody can divide us\u201d. Couple of months later they were divided.<\/p>\n I can\u2019t really discuss all reasons, but in my personal view, there were several important things that happened that facilitated that war, so to say. First of all, the unresolved problem from II World War, and this is the real number of victims on both sides. I will mention only two topics that are very problematic, and still are problematic in our history. One this is Jasenovac, the concentration camp, where Croats (because Croats had the Independent state of Croatia (NDH), a fascists\u00a0 state during 1941-1945) i.e. it\u2019s fascist army Usta\u0161e killed some 80.000 people, mostly Serbs, communists, and Gypsies. And then I will mention another topic, and this is the Bleiburg.\u00a0 This is a place in Austria, where the defeated army (Usta\u0161e, but also a lot of civilians) withdrew, going to the West, under the call protection of the allies, and they were killed by Tito\u2019s army. So it\u2019s butchery on both sides.<\/p>\n But these topics were not really discussed, because of - I believe some of you might recognize that -what we had in communist countries was not history, but ideology. It means history, interpreted in the way, the Communist Party wanted it. So that\u2019s not really history. It\u2019s on the one hand. And on the other, we had private memory of the people. And the gap between this ideologized history that we learned at school, and that was official - and the history, we kept in our hearts, and spoke about\u00a0\u00a0 at the table on Sunday lunch, and so on. These were two very dramatically different things, and there was a huge gap that was not bridged even until today.\u00a0 And I mention this because it has huge influence on the causes and reasons of these recent wars.<\/p>\n The other element in those wars (but first of all, I mean in Croatia) was that, I think, my generation, born after the War, was the last generation of believers in socialism. We lived well, we could travel, we had money, we exchanged it on the black market, went to Trieste to buy shoes. And one of my stories is about how we change freedom for a pair of Italian shoes, which really rings the bell. We could speak English, we could watch foreign movies, we could read foreign books (there was almost no censorship in that), so we were really pleased with the situation. What does it mean? It means the less pressure of the totalitarian government - the less resistance from people. It means that in Poland they had \u201cSolidarity\u201d, right? In Czechoslovakia they had Vaclav Havel and \u201cCharter 77\u201d, and so on. In Hungary at the beginning, at that time, they also had some kind of resistance. In Yugoslavia there was no resistance, there was no democratic political alternative. And why is it important?<\/p>\n When the war already started (but I will go to the beginning again), it means that there was only one force organized. In all of these republics were only nationalists, who were well organized. And there were well-organized from before. And then, at the certain point, we had great impacts of the nationalists, of the\u00a0 radical nationalists from abroad, who came to, for example, Croatia and got instant citizenship, and\u00a0 instantly were given very high positions in the army and in the government. So without democratic alternative, without the truth about\u00a0 the II World War , it was very easy to start the war. You had elements there. But\u2026you can\u2019t start the war just like that. I mean, you can\u2026 For example, if you ask me today to start the war, I can easily do it. I know exactly, how to go about that time, I\u2019m a journalist, I worked in the media, I know, how to make a good propaganda, and I can tell you step by step how to make the war. So if someone wants to hire me, please, you can do that. I know, it sounds really bad, but this is also one of the roles of the intellectuals, and this is what I want to talk about.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n So, in this situation you have then to imagine, how intellectuals are. Who are intellectuals at that time? They are writers, poets, academics, professors, that what in our communist lingo was called \u201cintelligentsia\u201d. You know that it is an expression from Soviet Union. And what is interesting about intelligentsia or intellectuals for me is the following: this Communist regime produces a certain type of intelligentsia. What type of intelligentsia? These people, who are highly educated, they have knowledge, they are doctors, academics, and so on, they are at the same time totally dependent upon the state. In socialist countries they can not survive working outside of state institutions, because there was no free market, there was nobody, who could earn living independently. They had to make their living somehow. So they worked in institutions, they worked in the newspapers,\u00a0\u00a0 in schools, in academia - all controlled by the Communist party. That\u2019s very clear.<\/p>\n So when there is a situation with the Communism falling apart, what happens in Yugoslavia is the following: since 1985 there is a huge struggle between these \u201cintelligentsia\u201d people in the media. Someone called it a \u201cmedia war\u201d. What does that mean? It means that there was a lot of writing of a nationalist type before anything happened. This nationalist writing was also in the function of nationalism in the republic. Especially when Milo\u0161evi\u0107 came into power in the second half of 1980s. After 1985 it became more and more pronounced. I mean Serbian nationalism. But it was not directed against Macedonia, against Croatia for that matter. No, it was directed against Kosovo. Kosovo was the beginning of the war. It\u2019s Kosovo. And the beginning of the nationalism of the really strong Serbian nationalism is Kosovo, which at that time was autonomous\u2026 not republic, but \u201cpokrajina\u201d i.e. region.<\/p>\n It is interesting because nationalism, so to say, gave wings to Milo\u0161evi\u0107. Milo\u0161evi\u0107 was an opportunist, whose only aim was to stay in power. He in his head (and I studied quite a lot this person, and I also wrote about him in the book about the\u00a0 Court in the Hague). He was an opportunist, who he did not have a war in his mind when it all started. He wanted to stay in power, and he understood that by forcing nationalism, riding on the wing of nationalism, he perhaps could do it. And he did it. But there were also other nationalisms to count on all around. So that was not that he is the nationalist, and a big boss, and then what?.. There is also Croatian nationalism, Slovenian nationalism, don\u2019t forget that. Then slowly through this writing about nationalism and against each other, especially Serbs against the Croats, the atmosphere was created. And by whom this atmosphere was created? By journalists, but under control of the regional nationalist leadership.<\/p>\n So somehow we come to that topic that I want to start, by showing you two very short clips. We\u2019ll have to switch off the light. The first one is concerning Sarajevo, and we are going to see \u2026<\/p>\n ... Well, I don\u2019t think it needs too much explanation, right? Another clip I want to show you, is another intellectual. This time this is the Croatian intellectual. His name is Slobodan Praljak. And this gentleman is also born in 1945, like Karad\u017ei\u0107, he is the engineer of the electronics. He is a philosopher, and he is also a movie and a theater director. He finished three universities, so highly educated person, who then, in 1993, orders destruction of over 400 years old bridge in Mostar. Mostar is in Bosnia, and is divided between East and West (in the East it\u2019s Muslim quarters, and in the West are Croatian quarters). This is one of the bridges, the oldest and the most beautiful, that is then destroyed. He also ended in the ICTY in the Hague. Karad\u017ei\u0107\u2019s process is still going on, and Praljak got 20 years sentence, but he appealed, and now we don\u2019t know, what will happen. In the meantime, in Croatia he is treated as a hero, as is Karad\u017ei\u0107 in Serbia. But this we can discuss later\u2026 This little clip shows of the collapse of the bridge in Mostar.<\/p>\n \u2026 But when you talk about these issues, it\u2019s interesting that people say: \u201cMy God, how is it possible that a poet, that a person like that could do such a terrible, such a horrifying thing?\u201d To me the answer is rather self-evident: poets they are not very much different from a carpenter, or a taxi-driver, or a porter, or somebody else, a baker let\u2019s say, somebody ordinary. But how could they do it? This is not the right question. The right question in my opinion is \u201cwhy wouldn\u2019t they do it?\u201d What do we presuppose is that writers and intellectuals in general are so special that they would not commit a crime, shoot or lust for power, order execution, come to corruption. It looks as if they would be by their education vaccinated against it. But, in spite of enough proofs that they are not, there is still a wide spread belief that intellectuals, and especially writers, are beings of a higher moral order.\u00a0 After all, they possess knowledge. And this idea of the knowledge that is freeing you, that makes you free, comes from our Enlightenment tradition. But they are always contradicted by the life.<\/p>\n So then my colleagues (writers, journalists, professors) in my own country decide to take automatically the side of the power. The power was nationalist at that time, before that the side of the power was communist. So they just switched like this. This I find very interesting.<\/p>\n Of course, as I told you, in my opinion, the source of such a behavior is their position during the communist time, the fact that they could not be free.<\/p>\n So I told you about Karad\u017ei\u0107, I told you about Praljak, but there is also another thing: we already arrived to beginning of wars. I think, what we should pay attention to, and this is basically my reason to choose this subject, is preparations for the war, the role of intellectuals in the psychological preparation. I don\u2019t think that anybody could kill just like that. Intellectuals come handy, because they are literate, they have knowledge, but this knowledge can be, so to say,\u00a0 commanded from above. It could be manipulated into using words almost as bullets. And what they are doing is preparing (by words, by writing, by speaking, by stimulating ideas) psychologically the situation for the war. Maybe some of you have read diaries of Victor Klemperer, and he is registering, in many details (he also wrote the book about language, change of the language during fascism), but he also records many details of how the life have changed at the beginning of the fascism, and how the intellectuals (let\u2019s call them this way, general name) are creating the enemy. And this is all about stirring up emotions of hatred by creating the enemy. In other words, in order to have a war, in order to kill somebody- you have to dehumanize the other side. You can not do it just like that. The tabu not to kill is very-very strong. So you have to convince your countrymen, first of all, to homogenize them\u2026 Sorry, first of all, to create the enemy and then homogenize people nationally. This is the task of intellectuals, and most of them were doing it willingly. If you were not willing to do such a thing, you were not in a very good position. As I said, war were preceded by the media-war, or the \u00abwar of words\u00bb. Journalists from Serbia and Croatia competed with historians and writers, describing the other nation as an enemy.<\/p>\n Also, nationalism was politically very instrumental in a situation (let\u2019s not forget) of inflation that had skyrocketed\u00a0 to 2500%. Can you imagine inflation of 2500%? They did not have prices in supermarkets, they had to change it every five minutes, so it was impossible to have prices. But the important thing about this inflation was that newspapers were printing the stories from II World War: they started to count the victims, all the skeletons hidden under the carpets, somehow crept out. Jasenovac and Bleiburg became issues, because they were covered before, mass graves were dug out, the bones were literally counted, and also some people took bones of their predecessors (mothers, fathers) home \u2013 from Croatia to Serbia, or from Serbia to Croatia. Old myths of Serbs as celestial people, and another myth of Croats, who wanted to have state for thousand years, and never succeeded, became more and more used. In other words, when you have history of nationalism, it is very easy to misuse it. But then it became rather dangerous at that point, because these nationalism forces became more and more organized. As I said, the key role was that we didn\u2019t have history, but ideology. In that situation you know what you are supposed to write, and you know how to use this knowledge in order to incite hatred.<\/p>\n I didn\u2019t mention that the most prominent Serbian novelist Dobrica \u0106osi\u0107 was the President of Serbia at the moment when Serbrenica happened. So it is a sad counterpoint to Vaclav Havel.<\/p>\n I\u2019m not going to mention here the names, but I just wanted to say very briefly that this is not\u2026 Ok, you could say, they were brought, they were controlled, but there were also some other people, who show that it was not necessary your choice. You could choose, you can choose in every situation (even Primo Levi said that you could choose in the worst of situations). There is a price to pay, but there\u2019s also always a choice.<\/p>\n I want to borrow one expression from Adam Michnik, who is attending this conference, who at that time of wars in former Yugoslavia said that nationalism in former Yugoslavia, contrary to the popular opinion in the West, was not so much repressed, as it was forgotten, or, better to say, \u201cit was dormant like a virus\u201d. I\u2019d like to borrow that analogy of nationalism as a virus, which means that you can wake it up at the moment when the conditions are opportune. Our bodies are full of viruses, but you don\u2019t know exactly when you are going to have the flu. You are going to have the flu, when other conditions are, so to say, good for the flu to develop. And I think, this is the best metaphor of the nationalism I\u2019ve ever heard.<\/p>\n Once in 1991, as a blood was shed (and when a blood is shed, it is a war)\u2026 And my definition of war is : the war begins when you no longer know the names of the victims. You remember the names of the first victims, you have them on covers, you have their pictures. This is not the war yet. When you have so many victims that you can not remember them any longer, then this is the war.<\/p>\n But what about intellectuals, we saw now, could be \u00abbad guys\u00bb? Can they be \u00abgood guys\u00bb? Judging by the behavior of the intellectuals of the former Yugoslavia, and now in independent republics of Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia, it seems to me, they didn\u2019t learn very much, because they \u201ccling\u201d to the power exactly as they did before. Although now they have much bigger choice, because this is now democracy. So what is democracy in respect to intellectuals? Democracy does not produce dissidents, democracy only produces people of different opinion. If you are expressing different opinion in democracy, you are not going to be punished \u2013 or theoretically so. But many didn\u2019t notice that switch. Why? It is very interesting. Because what happened in Yugoslavia, what happened throughout the Eastern block, the \u201cswitch\u201d, the change of political system (even in Russia) from communism into democracy , not necessarily means that by building democratic institutions, you have democracy. What remained to be done is to change people, and their mentality, and that is happening, but did not really happen yet. That is, you have\u00a0 formally a democracy, you have everything what democracy formally requires. But the system, the people are operating according to the old principles, according to the old methods(which is, of course, the reason for the corruption), along the party lines, along the family lines, and along dealing and wheeling with your comrades. This remained exactly the same, there is no difference before and now. And while this mentality prevails, it will be very-very difficult, and it is still very-very difficult to develop democracy.<\/p>\n But what about the \u201cgood guys\u201d? We didn\u2019t come to the \u201cgood guys\u201d yet, because I would like to give you an example of Croatian association. It was called \u201cAssociation of Croatian writers\u201d. Collapse of communism didn\u2019t produce much change there, and instead of \u201cCroatian Association of Writers\u201d it is now named \u201cAssociation of Croatian Writers\u201d. You would think that this is not indicative, but it is very indicative. Of course, then we formed another independent association. But I mean to switch from \u201cCroatian Association of Writers\u201d to \u201cAssociation of Croatian Writers\u201d means Serbs to be excluded, and everybody else to be excluded. And it works. And when several writers protested then, they resigned in membership, and the rest of the members enthusiastically applauded their resignation. So this is how it was, and how it is still very much is.<\/p>\n Even today intellectuals are very eager to demonstrate their new political correctness, and the new political correctness is still the loyalty to the ruling parties, loyalty to the nation and to the Croatian state. So authoritarian regime had collapsed, but still there is fear, and there is still dependence from the ruling party.<\/p>\n In fact, nationalism gives you very little space to be critical. It is better now than before, but... I can\u2019t say, situation is the same as twenty years ago, but considering that twenty years have passed - I can\u2019t say in my free conscience that we have a complete freedom. One of the reasons is that the media and the government are very closely tied together (not through the party connections, but through the connections of the capital, and the government). So it is different kind of connection, but it is still ruling the freedom of expression at least in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia (this are the countries, I know a little bit more about). We, journalists, for example, are working as transmitters of party power. And this is interesting, because it goes up and down. For example, when we were entering the EU almost a year ago (Croatia is the last member of the EU), before that there was much European propaganda (there was a small anti-European propaganda, of course), but I mean that, for example, HDZ (Hrvatska\u00a0demokratska zajednica), a conservative party of Tu\u0111man, a right-wing party, was insisting on the membership in EU, so they were advocating the EU. But very soon, as Croatia entered the EU, they started this anti-Union propaganda, seeing that nothing goes as it should have gone, in their heads, in their imagination. And it really didn\u2019t, because Croatia entered in a very bad moment, when economy was very-very bad.<\/p>\n When we are thinking of the positive role of the intellectuals, we have also to remember such important names as Adam Michnik (who is here, and if you haven\u2019t seen, or haven\u2019t heard him, you should). As Tim Snyder said, introducing him to your Prime-minister, \u201cthis is the biggest Pole living\u201d, and I completely agree to that. So the \u201cbig Pole\u201d Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuro\u0144, \u00a0Bronis\u0142aw Geremek, who unfortunately died, Vaclav Havel, Ji\u0159\u00ed Dienstbier, Mikl\u00f3s Haraszti, J\u00e1nos Kis, Gy\u00f6rgy\u00a0Konr\u00e1d. All these are the names, you have heard of, but these are what we could qualify as \u201cthe other side\u201d of intellectual activity. The ideas of civil society, of introducing moral into politics (remember what Havel was talking about of \u201cliving in truth\u201d, this is his expression of political pluralism) haven\u2019t been possible without efforts of people like them.<\/p>\n But what happened to them after the revolution? Are they still important? (We know, what happened to Havel). They played a big role in preparing the revolution, as those others played a big role in preparing the wars.\u00a0 And it seems to me that for a period of time they have lost their influence. If so, are we to say, it\u2019s normal? The more normal the society, the less need for public moralist, redeemers of people or intellectual heroes. It is a sign of normality.<\/p>\n On the other hand, in former Yugoslavia, for example, in the society that is far from normalization (because of the nationalism, and because of lack of reconciliation, which is another topic), and where we still have a tough struggle between authoritarian and liberal forces, perhaps critical intellectuals were written off too early, in belief that democracy would take care of itself. Are they still needed?<\/p>\n Long ago one intellectual turned out Havel\u2019s invitation to take up governmental position, with explanation that someone has to remain independent. Havel pointed out that if all intellectuals would follow his example, there is a danger that nobody would be able to remain independent, because there would be nobody in power, who would make possible, and guarantee his independence. Perhaps intellectuals in the 19th century role of preachers, politicians, teachers, and national leaders, all in one, are still necessary in our part of the world? Here is ,then, to you to answer this question: are intellectuals necessary in this society, what role do they play in this society, are they \u201cbad guys\u201d, are they \u201cgood guys\u201d, and what role do they play now in respect to government? In my view, one has to be always critical, always hold a mirror against any kind of a government.<\/p>\n Thank you very much for your attention. I hope I haven\u2019t been terribly boring. And I\u2019m ready to answer your questions. Thank you.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0QA:<\/strong><\/p>\n \u2026 And nobody expected, what happened since then in Ukraine. But in the meantime Ukraine is trying very hard to embark to this train. And, well, we don\u2019t know, what\u2019s going to happen, but I think, what had happened at the end of last year, and at the beginning of this year is quite magnificent. At the lost of lives, unfortunately, but yes, a lot has changed. And this is one of the reasons, I think, we are here to support this struggle for pro-European government and democracy in this country. And that\u2019s fascinating. And I think that there are a lot of people, who are not only supporting, but admiring you, Ukrainian people, to be able to do all of that, and watching very carefully what is going to happen, and also being very-very much afraid of what might happen here.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u2026 Yes, thank you for the compliment, and I don\u2019t know how topical it is, and I cannot really judge very well, what the solution of \u00abDaytonization\u00bb (40:07) would bring. I only can make parallel to what happened in Bosnia. And in \u00a0Bosnia happened a catastrophe. In my opinion, in Bosnia it was not a good solution. And you might have heard that the last autumn Bosnians were protesting on the streets against the government. It\u2019s a stagnation in Bosnia, there is nothing happening, and I tell you why. The reason is a simple one. They are fed by the international community. You will be shocked, if I tell you that in a country of four million people, divided in cantons (actually, the structure is very complex), there are 163 ministers. These ministers have drivers, they have secretaries, offices, cars, and they can give jobs to their relatives. Do you think, these people are going to leave their jobs without fighting? Never. So, seriously speaking, international protectorat\u00a0 didn\u2019t show a good result in Bosnia.<\/p>\n But if we are making parallels between what happened in Balkans, and what is happening here, we have to think about another thing, and this thing is the size of Ukraine. I, for example, do not trust European Union, because it did nothing in Bosnia, it didn\u2019t resolve anything. Not even the war wouldn\u2019t have finished without Americans. American bombing finished the war, they forced the peace agreement - Hollbrooke twisting the arm of Milo\u0161evi\u0107. These are the people, who understand only the language of power, of violence.\u00a0 The EU was not capable of resolving the problem of a tiny little country, tiny especially compared to Ukraine. Now the curse and the blessing of Ukraine is that it\u2019s so big, and you can\u2019t dismiss it like that. You can\u2019t say, \u201cok, this is some far country, who cares about that? We are going to pour some money there, and that\u2019s it, keep these ministers going on, it doesn\u2019t matter\u201d. But for Ukraine it can\u2019t be. Ukraine is too big and too important. They will have to come hopefully with some measures, some solutions that are not a joke, that are not to be laughed at.<\/p>\n Personally, from the experience I have, \u00abDaytonization\u00bb would not be such a good idea, because in this way it would have been much easier for Putin to swallow one by one part. \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u2026 Well, actually, now situation\u2026 It was different. There were mainly female intellectuals, who were opposing nationalism and the war. And you can draw whatever conclusions you want from that, but this is how it was. For some reason or the other, they were not so fanatical about that. So they paid the price, you know. We have the case of five intellectuals that were practically so much smeared in the newspapers that they could not work, some of them had to go to other country. I\u2019m one of them, I have to say. So consequences of that behavior are difficult especially during the war, because you are risking quite a lot. But I would not go being the feminist myself, I do not want to make further conclusion along this line. For example, it is more natural for the women to be against the war (I think, it is, but I mean that it requires a separate complicated discussion about women and men in general).<\/p>\n There is no such a thing as common foreign politics in EU. And that\u2019s the disaster. And that we have felt very much in the wars in the Balkans. There is no the European Union foreign policy, there is no European Union culture policy, there is no the EU economic policy. There is only this interest against that interest. And as far as a journalism goes, it is pretty much works along these lines, and there are very few dissenting opinions. But I think that, on the other hand, there are quite a lot of at least sympathy (if not understanding) for what is happening here.<\/p>\n To understand is one thing\u2026 First of all, it is a very big shock, what happened with Crimea. It is enormous shock. It takes time to process, to swallow this, to understand that for the first time from the II World War\u2026 somebody said yesterday (I forgot who it was)\u2026 there was aggression, one country went into another country, and took part of it. I mean, this is shocking, and it takes time to understand it.<\/p>\n On the other hand, I think of a kind of \u201cjustification\u201d of Putin and Putin\u2019s politics\u2026 In my opinion, there are two reasons for that. One is fear. And the other is fear of helplessness that you don\u2019t know who could do something there. For sure, Americans are not going to bomb there. NATO is not going to act. The III World War will not happen, in my opinion. And who is then going to stop Putin? I\u2019m afraid, apart from the sympathies that intellectuals in the West are expressing, you are very much alone in this struggle. I do not know, how much it can help you, and this is why we are here, on this conference. So you are actually talking to \u201cwrong guys\u201d, because we are trying to be \u201cgood guys\u201d. It comes from not really knowing, being afraid and knowing that there is not really any solution in terms of actual power acting there. So it\u2019s a sad fact that Ukraine is pretty much alone (of course, it\u2019s only my personal view). But also the other side of that is that Ukraine, again, is a big country, which means a big potential, which means a big possibility to defend yourself, and to build something out of this situation. Of course, it\u2019s not a satisfactory answer, but I am not a politician.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u2026 Your experiences are a part of yourself, of your view, of your personality. You can\u2019t get rid, even if you want, of your experience. And, of course, very often there is some misunderstanding. I also feel it, when I\u2019m talking to my colleagues, who come from the West, and who are very \u201ctheoretical\u201d, as you say, and who often do not know very much about our conditions of living, that we are missing each other, missing in the meaning is different. And I do think, I wouldn\u2019t claim that it\u2019s ontological difference, but it is experience that defines us. And therefore, just because of this experience, whatever they say, we know (or, at least, I know) that changes can not grow as fast as we need them to happen. It is a very slow process. And I think, struggling with mentality is one of the biggest struggles we have. And I think that in this part of the world we still need people who are going, in moral terms actually, to tell us what to do.<\/p>\n Why? Because we can not trust our politicians. In Eastern Europe, in the period of transition, we have learned this very tough lecture. And this is the lesson: we can not trust them, they are corrupt, they do not represent public values and public needs. So there must be somewhere someone who deserves our trust, and who can represent public issues, because they are not. So what do you do, you as a people, as a country? You are left alone, you don\u2019t trust the politicians, they are corrupt, media are corrupt. So, like in bed old times, you have to have some voice, you can trust.<\/p>\n The problem however is another: where do they express themselves? How can you express yourself in the world, which is totally ruled by the media that are privatized, and that are also politically governed? For example, if I have some opinion I want to express, I would hardly find the media, the platform in Croatia, where I could say something, which is critical, or important. Because there are no such platforms any longer. So we are caught into this not only with \u201cwhat\u201d and \u201chow\u201d, but \u201cwhere\u201d. And this is one of the biggest problems, because you do not have to address, and to defend public interest.<\/p>\n Is this why you are publishing in \u201cThe Guardian\u201d?<\/em><\/p>\n Well, from time to time yes. But it\u2019s sad, because when you speak, publishing in \u201cThe Guardian\u201d, or \u201cS\u00fcddeutsche Zeitung\u201d, I have noticed one very funny phenomenon. And that is that Croatian people, who work in the government, or who work in the media, they register every time I write something in English. But if I write something in German, in Swedish, Danish, or in some other country, they don\u2019t register it because they don\u2019t know the language.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u2026 I think, it\u2019s a very good comment, but, as I said, I leave all the comparison about Ukraine actually to you. The question about commission for reconciliation in former Yugoslavia is a very interesting question, because I have been dealing with it, and wrote something about that. And in my opinion, no, it\u2019s not going to work. And there have been such an initiative, but it didn\u2019t work.<\/p>\n We have different culture. In that culture, if you come out, and say, \u201cI have killed your child\u201d, the mother might even come to you, kiss you, and say: \u201cMy son, I forgive you!\u201d -\u00a0 but nevertheless,\u00a0 an uncle would kill the perpetrator who confessed tomorrow. You should not forget that in the Balkans there is a very strong tradition, especially, in some parts, of a blood feud. So to shed blood in revenge is more common than to forgive. I\u2019m talking about centuries back, but this is actually one of the reasons, why it doesn\u2019t work.<\/p>\n It was formed such a commission in Sarajevo, and its head was Jacob Finci (I don\u2019t know if he\u2019s still there), he\u2019s a Jew. And it absolutely didn\u2019t and couldn\u2019t work. In my opinion, and it\u2019s my deep experience and conviction, it\u2019s because a war comes from the top, not from the bottom. It has to be incited, and\u00a0 it comes from the top.<\/p>\n Therefore, the peace should take exactly the same way. It should come from the top. And what does it mean? It means that it needs series of attempts from state institutions (it was done that the President of one country comes to the President of the other, and says \u201csorry\u201d, and then the other President says \u201csorry\u201d, and so they go ceremonially). On the levels of institutions too. So, political level, institutional level, but most of all, on the level of history, because one of the causes, why this war started was history, the fact that we did not have history, but ideology. Historians have an enormous, big, important task to finally produce some kind of truth. Why? Because I think, we have to have reconciliation about this truth as well.<\/p>\n Couple of years ago in Serbia they denied Srebrenica. Students from the law faculty put out the declaration that Srebrenica never happened (and it\u2019s a place, where in 1995 eight thousand Muslim men and boys were killed, exterminated; so there\u2019s a huge mass grave). Couple of years later Serbian Parliament put the declaration recognizing mass killings in Srebrenica. So the task of historians, and people who work in education is to produce the textbooks that hold some kind of\u00a0 this \u201ccommon truth\u201d, because without common truth there is no justice. And without it the whole process of reconciliation falls into nothing.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>","short_description":" \u00a0<\/p>\n May 15-19, 2014, Kyiv <\/em><\/p>\n International conference \"Ukraine: Thinking Together\"\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n I\u2019m very pleased, and it\u2019s my pleasure to be here, and to be invited, because first of all I\u2019m for the first time in Kyiv, in Ukraine. I\u2019ve never been here before. I must say, I\u2019m very curious about the city, but also I\u2019m even more curious about people.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>","cover":"base64img\/20210407\/drakulic.jpg","link":null,"published_at":"2014-05-31T21:00:00.000000Z","is_published":true,"created_by":2608,"created_at":"2014-06-12T10:55:09.000000Z","updated_at":"2021-04-22T13:11:52.000000Z","deleted_at":null,"like_count":1,"comment_count":0,"view_count":2552,"view_unique_count":2552,"file":"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=kPMQjmYVqSA","is_file":false,"material_type":"Media","authors":[],"categories":[{"id":8312,"parent_id":0,"slug":"european-studies","title":"European Studies","path":null,"alias":null,"real_path":null,"level":0,"sort_order":67,"content_count":0,"content_views":0,"content_updated_at":"2021-04-21T10:29:37.000000Z","content_last_viewed_at":null,"created_by":null,"deleted_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":null,"language_id":1,"old_id":3048,"pivot":{"material_id":2418,"category_id":8312,"material_type":"App\\Models\\Material\\MediaFile"}},{"id":8310,"parent_id":0,"slug":"global-processes-and-social-changes","title":"Global Processes and Social Changes","path":null,"alias":null,"real_path":null,"level":0,"sort_order":61,"content_count":0,"content_views":0,"content_updated_at":"2021-04-21T10:29:37.000000Z","content_last_viewed_at":null,"created_by":null,"deleted_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":null,"language_id":1,"old_id":2790,"pivot":{"material_id":2418,"category_id":8310,"material_type":"App\\Models\\Material\\MediaFile"}},{"id":8316,"parent_id":0,"slug":"international-relations","title":"International Relations","path":null,"alias":null,"real_path":null,"level":0,"sort_order":83,"content_count":0,"content_views":0,"content_updated_at":"2021-04-21T10:29:40.000000Z","content_last_viewed_at":null,"created_by":null,"deleted_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":null,"language_id":1,"old_id":2982,"pivot":{"material_id":2418,"category_id":8316,"material_type":"App\\Models\\Material\\MediaFile"}},{"id":8320,"parent_id":0,"slug":"political-science","title":"Political Science","path":null,"alias":null,"real_path":null,"level":0,"sort_order":101,"content_count":0,"content_views":0,"content_updated_at":"2021-04-21T10:29:43.000000Z","content_last_viewed_at":null,"created_by":null,"deleted_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":null,"language_id":1,"old_id":1456,"pivot":{"material_id":2418,"category_id":8320,"material_type":"App\\Models\\Material\\MediaFile"}},{"id":8349,"parent_id":0,"slug":"human-rights","title":"Human rights","path":null,"alias":null,"real_path":null,"level":0,"sort_order":398,"content_count":0,"content_views":0,"content_updated_at":"2021-04-21T10:29:44.000000Z","content_last_viewed_at":null,"created_by":null,"deleted_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2022-03-17T13:47:27.000000Z","language_id":1,"old_id":849,"pivot":{"material_id":2418,"category_id":8349,"material_type":"App\\Models\\Material\\MediaFile"}}],"tags":[{"id":3978,"title":"\u0421\u043b\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 \u0414\u0440\u0430\u043a\u0443\u043b\u0456\u0447","created_by":null,"pivot":{"material_id":2418,"tag_id":3978,"material_type":"App\\Models\\Material\\MediaFile"}}],"featured_topics":[]},{"id":2191,"slug":"audio-william-burke-white-possible-scenarios-ukrainian-protests","language_id":1,"title":"William Burke-White: On possible scenarios of Ukrainian protests","short_title":null,"media_type":2,"description":" Professor Burke-White <\/a>is an expert on international law and global governance. He served in the Obama administration from 2009 to 2011, on Secretary Clinton\u2019s policy planning staff, providing the Secretary direct policy advice on multilateral diplomacy and international institutions.<\/em> <\/span><\/p>\n Welcome<\/strong>.<\/span><\/p>\n It\u2019s a pleasure to be with you this morning.<\/p>\n Looking at the events surrounding the Euromaidan, or what is called the Euromaidan, in Ukraine how do you see the possible ways out of this impasse, from the perspective of international law?<\/strong><\/p>\n It\u2019s a difficult question, in part because our moral sentiments and the law may not always be on the same side. Obviously, I, personally, am very glad to see the Ukrainian people raising their voice and standing up for what they believe in. At the same time, international law tends to support the government that\u2019s in power, particularly when that government has been legitimately elected, and until such a time as the government commits acts so heinous as to undermine its legitimacy. And that means that simply overthrowing or toppling the government may not receive broad recognition internationally. It also means that sometimes operating within constitutional rules, rather than outside of them, may be a better strategy.<\/p>\n So what does that mean about where this protest could go? On one hand, it could continue to grow to be so large that it toppled the existing government, and, regardless of where the law is, as long as that protest does so without resorting to violence, then eventually, I think, the protesters would come into power and replace the existing government. But, I think, that is hard to do, as we\u2019ve seen in the Arab Spring, it\u2019s very hard for a protest movement to overthrow an existing government.<\/p>\n On the other hand of the spectrum, one could negotiate a solution with the current government. That usually requires two things. One \u2013 there being a clear voice of the opposition, who is both able and willing to engage with the government. And in the case of Ukraine, I\u2019m not sure I see exactly who that voice would be and, at least from the rhetoric that I hear on TV and elsewhere, not a lot of common ground on which to negotiate such a solution.<\/p>\n The other challenge of a negotiated solution is that the leaders have to be able to actually control the protesters \u2013 the leverage that they have when they\u2019re meeting with the current government is that they can say: \u201cIf you accede to these demands, the protest will go home.\u201d And, again, I\u2019m not sure that\u2019s the case in Ukraine today, precisely because it is such a broad-based popular uprising.<\/p>\n The last option is, essentially, that the protesters use this as an opportunity to lay down a marker. To say to the government: \u201cWe are powerful. We do not like the direction you are taking this country. And, while we will at some point soon go home, we stand ready to return. We will be watching you.\u201d And that\u2019s a message, I think, that resonates very powerfully with international law and with the international community.<\/p>\n For example, the protesters say: \u201cHere are the three constitutional guarantees that we have in our constitution, or that maybe you took away when you revised the constitution, that must be abided by. And in 2015 there will be an election, and it better be a free and fair election.\u201d I think that\u2019s the kind of message and marker that, if it\u2019s put down, and the protesters go home for the holidays, or because it gets too cold \u2013 and go home in a coordinated fashion, not just trickle off \u2013 the government has to know that if they don\u2019t listen to those demands, these protests will be back.<\/p>\n If we look at the current strategy of the government, do you see any logic behind it? Do you think those are strategically smart moves, if we played devil\u2019s advocate? I mean what happened on the Maidan on the night from November 30 to December 1 and also the recent, two days ago, attempts of the government to disperse the demonstrations.<\/strong><\/p>\n So, I think the government has made a number of errors, but on at least one ground they are being strategically smart. While there has been some violence, there has not been the kind of bloody incidents, which we saw, say, in Tunisia, in Lybia, where a government decides that it is willing to kill en masse its own people. And that\u2019s strategically smart, not just because it\u2019s in conformity with international law, but the kind of actions that get the United States or other involved that really can overnight shift the balance of political support on this sort of an uprising is those horrible bloody moments on television. And, I think, the government\u2019s withdrawal two days ago was a calculated choice not to cross that line where, they thought, it would shift the political dynamic.<\/p>\n At the same time, I think, the government\u2019s made real errors here.\u00a0 I think the government significantly underestimated the potential for protests. There are protests all around the world every day \u2013 there are usually twenty people, two hundred people, or two thousand people. Wise governments figure out how to accede to the demands of those protesters in a minor way or get them to go home. You never, if you are a sitting government, want three hundred thousand, a million, whatever number it was, people out on the square protesting against you. And, I think, the government massively underestimated the willingness of the Ukrainian people to stand up for what they believe in and for their rights.<\/p>\n In retrospect, the government should have dealt with this when it was smaller, less entrenched, easier for all sides to back down \u2013 and they didn\u2019t. Which leads us to the impasse we\u2019re in today, where the government, I think, doesn\u2019t want to use real violence, or bloody, horrible violence, even if they are using some real violence. The protesters don\u2019t want to go home without achieving their goals, and that creates this impasse from which it is very hard to back down.<\/p>\n So, on one level, the government is being strategically smart, on the other level, a series of mistakes, where the government overestimated its own power, brought us to where we are today.<\/p>\n If we look at similar events in the past, I mean other countries \u2013 what is the usual way of negotiation, if such negotiations were to take place? Who are the actors usually, internationally, nationally, and what are usually the outcomes?<\/strong><\/p>\n So, where these sorts of things get negotiated successfully, I think, the actors are first of all the concentrated leadership group of the protesters. But a leadership group that is maybe not the person whom government hates most. It\u2019s someone who is respected by the protesters, but also is seen as a real negotiating partner by the government.<\/p>\n It is often the case that the international community does get involved, but it is usually not the United States or Russia, or some other major power in the region that is involved, it\u2019s a minor power. For example, the Middle East, it\u2019s often then the Qataris or the Emiratis, who could be respected by all sides, but weren\u2019t directly involved. I don\u2019t know who that might be here. You can think of kind of a range of middle powers that range from the Swiss to the Canadians. It could also be the EU itself, though that has complications, given the nature of the protesters\u2019 demands. It\u2019s probably not the United States, and not a country that has energy needs in Russia, precisely because then it gets more complicated. So, it may well be a country outside of the region.<\/p>\n And oftentimes what happens is that that country provides what we would call \u201cgood offices\u201d, a forum for conversation between the government and the protesters. And then what you would hope would happen is that a negotiation would be reached, in which the government accedes to some of demands, far more than they wanted to, but the protesters often get much less than they wanted to, as well.<\/p>\n In this case, I can see a deal being reached, where the government promises free and fair elections, that it will not sign any agreements on trade or anything else with either the EU or Russia during the current mandate of the government, and that some basic constitutional concerns are addressed. In exchange, the protesters would have to go home, saying \u201cWe\u2019re not overthrowing this government. We will give them one final chance, but we\u2019re ready to go to the ballot boxes in 2015.\u201d<\/p>\n To do that, it requires an overlapping win set - both protesters and the government need to be able to find this set of terms that make sense. I think, that also requires the protesters to make much more clear than they have \u2013 or maybe it\u2019s just what we\u2019re seeing in the media here that isn\u2019t as clear \u2013 as to what their demands are. What are negotiable demands? What are absolute demands? What are the wishes we use to, perhaps, rile up the protesters and keep people on the square, and what are the things we absolutely need to achieve to be able to feel like this was worth doing and a success.<\/p>\n So, I urge the protest movement to clarify its goals. And, also, to clarify them in a way that third countries and others outside of Ukraine can really understand and grapple with. At the same time, I think, the government needs to be willing to say \u201cWe want to negotiate.\u201d I haven\u2019t heard that from the government in the meaningful way, either. So, those would be the two markers I would look for, before I would say \u201cIt\u2019s time to try to find a negotiated solution.\u201d<\/p>\n Given the fact how clear or unclear the message of the protesters has been to the international community, do you think that the reaction on the part of the international community, and in particular the United States, has been adequate to the situation?<\/strong><\/p>\n So, the United States, I think, was slow to get engaged here. We saw a strong statement from Secretary Kerry earlier this week. That is very much consistent with the level of engagement the United States usually has. As I started by saying, the law here, unfortunately, is on the side of the government. And that means that the United States doesn\u2019t want to get too far out in front of supporting the protesters against the government. If you look at the U.S. policy in the Middle East, in Tunisia, in Egypt \u2013 the U.S. was very slow to formally side against the government. So, what I think the United States has done, is said to the Ukrainian government \u201cAllow the protest to continue and do not crack down on it violently. It\u2019s why Victoria Nuland, the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, has been in Kyiv this week, precisely because, I think, that makes it much harder for the government to crack down brutally.<\/p>\n But I don\u2019t think you will see a stronger response by the U.S., unless there is such a brutal crackdown. If you think back to Egypt, it was when the protesters were standing on Tahrir square and there was a real threat of massive violence against them, the United States changed its position. If you think about Lybia, it was when Quaddafi rolled tanks at Benghazi that the United States changed its position.<\/p>\n So, what I hope will continue is that the United States will remain very vigilant. I would love to see the President or other senior officials also chime in. But what I think you will see them say is that \u201cWe support the goals that the protesters are expressing. We support freedom of assembly and freedom of speech and constitutional government.\u201d But you won\u2019t see them say \u201cWe support the overthrow of the current government.\u201d<\/p>\n I also think that for the United States, as well as for some key European states, whether we like it or not, these protests raise broader questions of the relationships in the region. I think these countries will not want to endanger those relationships by getting too far ahead of it.<\/p>\n But the sentiments, the goals of the protest, I think, are supported. To the degree the protesters continue to express those goals in terms that reflect the international human rights movement, the rights to democracy, the rights to constitutional government, to freedom of speech and assembly \u2013 that will resonate much more with the international community than will specific claims about joining this trade agreement or that trade agreement or broader claims calling for the overthrow of the government. Those are the kinds of things that, I think, get foreign governments to say: \u201cWe don\u2019t want to engage too far here.\u201d<\/p>\n If you think about possible steps by the United States, what is the spectrum of possible reactions, let\u2019s say, in the worst case scenario? In Ukraine, one of the most popular stories is that a petition to the White House gathered 100,000 signatures within three days, mostly from Ukrainian citizens living in Ukraine, urging the White House to impose personal sanctions on President Yanukovich and his government, his surroundings. Is that at all realistic? If not, what are realistic reactions here?<\/strong><\/p>\n I think it\u2019s unrealistic that the White House will unilaterally impose personal sanctions on Yanukovich. I think, for the White House for the moment, the international agenda is very complicated: there is an ongoing peace negotiation in Iran, there is hope of a peace settlement eventually in the Middle East more generally, there are concerns about an assertive China \u2013 all of those things are, not surprisingly, higher on the United States agenda than the current protests in Ukraine.<\/p>\n So, I think, for the White House, this will continue to be a sort of tertiary, rather than primary, concern. I think the thing that would tip that would be a brutal crackdown by the government of Ukraine. And, I think, such a crackdown would lead to a much stronger response. It would be a response that would be framed in much more categorical terms. It could well be a response that leads to the United States try to take action in international fora, or other countries taking action in international institutions where the United States supports it.<\/p>\n And so that worst case scenario, I think, you could well see: sanctions, efforts to refer a case to the International Criminal Court, which I don\u2019t think would be likely, but might be attempted, claims to various human rights institutions and bodies. Short of that, I think that the most you\u2019re likely to see is a kind of continued vigilance by the United States to avoid bloodshed.\u00a0<\/p>\n I think the call that would resonate most in Washington is not for unilateral sanction, but for efforts to preserve the integrity of the electoral process in 2015. President Obama has talked a great deal \u2013 I would urge people to listen to the speech in Cairo back in 2010, just after coming into office, where he says: \u201cWe will support the aspirations for democracy, but we will not impose government on you.\u201d And, I think, that is very much his mindset. He doesn\u2019t want to come in and impose a revolution, but if the people ask for help in ensuring that the elections in 2015 are free and fair, I think, that\u2019s the kind of thing the United States would take very seriously.<\/p>\n It\u2019s not too early right now to begin that process, working through the OSCE, the UN, through other organizations to make sure that there is no way that this government \u2013 not just by stuffing the ballot box, but by structuring the political process leading up to the election \u2013 can undermine the rights and the ability of the Ukrainian people to express their will. So that\u2019s how I would frame an argument to Washington.<\/p>\n A very interesting question has been how do we compare these events in Ukraine to the events in Russia, on Bolotnaya Square. Do you see any similarities and do you see any possible comparisons here?<\/strong><\/p>\n I think there are similarities. One thing I have been truly impressed by is the strength of the Ukrainian people. And I think much more so than we have ever seen in Russia: today, there are hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians standing outside in what I understand is negative 15 degree weather, and they are still there. And when we look at the protests in Russia from 1991 on, with very few exceptions, they have been relatively small, they have been quite dispersed, quite diffuse, and they have not been as unified as what we\u2019re seeing in Ukraine. And you have to then take into account the fact that Ukraine is a much smaller country than Russia. I did the math yesterday: something like 10 percent of the population of Kyiv was standing out in square. We\u2019ve never seen that in Russia.<\/p>\n And so, I think, to me that\u2019s a suggestion that the trajectories of, perhaps, Russian political culture in history and Ukrainian political culture in history are very different. And one of the things that, I hope, Washington and other capitals see is that this isn\u2019t the kind of protest we\u2019ve seen in Russia. This is a very different kind of political movement, one that, I think, is much stronger and needs to be interpreted on its own terms.<\/p>\n In some ways, I feel more similarities to what\u2019s going on here with what\u2019s happening in the Middle East than I do with what\u2019s happened in Russia. So, maybe the Ukrainian people, in a way, could be a lesson for their Russian colleagues and counterparts on how to remain strong and unified, even in the face of defiance and opposition.<\/p>\n Let\u2019s hope for a positive outcome of the current events. Thank you very much.<\/strong><\/p>\n A pleasure to be with you. Best of luck to all.<\/p>\n \nThis conversation was recorded on December 12, 2013.\u00a0<\/p>\n Intro: Stefon Harris, \u00abSunset and the Mockingbird\u00bb (\u00abAfrican Tarantella\u00bb, Blue Note, 2006). Music arrangement for this podcast: Omar Thomas (http:\/\/www.omarthomasmusic.com<\/a>).<\/p>","short_description":"
\nInternational conference \"Ukraine: Thinking Together\"<\/em><\/p>\n
\nInternational conference \"Ukraine: Thinking Together\"<\/em><\/p>\n